



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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East-West Understanding: Two-Way Street

by Chester Bowles

We stand now at a new time of decision. Out of the current confusion and conflict one thing has become clear: If there is to be peace, that peace must be created on the basis of a new understanding between East and West—an understanding which will give new focus and new meaning to the ideas and aspirations which the free nations of East and West hold in common. And this understanding must be a two-way street.

For generations Asians have seethed under the weary superiority of Westerners explaining that they came originally to Asia not for personal profit but to uplift the natives and to introduce them to the blessings of Western civilization. When Westerners now say that they have come to save Asia from communism, a wave of resentment surges from Casablanca to Suez to the Sea of Japan.

The hypocrisy of the old-time "white man's burden" theme is obvious not only to Asians but to all thoughtful Westerners. The record of the colonial past makes the task of understanding between East and West difficult at best. But as the West begins belatedly to seek a new basis for cooperation, it finds itself confronted with still another hurdle—an

Asian state of mind that might be described as the "brown man's burden."

Many outspoken Asians, filled with a sense of their own moral superiority, seem to have convinced themselves that the West is inhabited by racially prejudiced warmongers who measure their civilization solely by the numbers of their bathtubs and atomic bombs. The one hope of saving the world from its utter poverty of principle these Asians maintain, is a stiff dose of Asian spirituality administered to the erring Europeans and Americans through periodic lectures. This attitude does not make for easier relationships.

My admiration for the accomplishments of the new nations of Asia runs deep. My dislike of the classic Western point of view toward Asia and Africa is, I hope, well established. However, to those who throw stones with such abandon at the West, I cannot resist pointing out that they, too, live in a glass house. While the Asian has been telling the Westerner that he must understand the mind and heart of Asia, the new power and responsibilities of Asia require a greater effort by Asians to understand the West.

Let us begin with the most basic question

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of all—colonialism. Asia's recent bitter experience with the Western variety of colonialism tends to erase memories of non-Western imperialism conducted by Asians in Asia, of which Japanese aggression between 1931 and 1945 is only the most recent major example. A careful re-reading of their own history will provide objective Asians with further proof that colonialism is not a Western disease.

Many Indians, for instance, boast of India's early colonialization in South Asia. From the time of Asoka until Western explorers filled the Eastern seas, India was a radiating center of culture, trade and conquest.

Even with the examples of Buddha, Asoka and Gandhi, Asia remains much like the rest of the world in its quick resort, under emotional pressure, to violence. Like many other Asians, Pakistanis and Indians are quick to criticize America's inability to find a basis for agreement with the Soviet Union and Red China. Yet these two peoples, who lived for centuries under the same government and who for the most part speak the same languages, are themselves in bitter conflict. If they could adopt a reasonably coordinated policy toward the world, the outlook for peace in Asia would be immeasurably improved.

Nor has the West any monopoly on the pursuit of materialism. The proverbial patience of the East—the plodding peasant who finds happiness in song, the sense of timelessness in the villages—is still an important part of the Asian picture.

Yet one of the most essential facts about the developing New Asia is its frank thirst for material progress. This impatience to catch up, to become equal with the West in every way, is reflected in the policies of every Asian government. It is haste for material growth, far more than for spiritual renunciation of Western ways, which now seems to be the common concern of the peoples and their parliaments.

Asians' Double Standard

Another question which honestly troubles many Westerners is the curious double standard that Asian spokesmen so often seem to apply in forming their international judgments. From the beginning of time, Asia's great religious leaders have meticulously taught that even the most laudable ends can never justify evil means. This is the very core of Gandhi's teaching.

Nevertheless, free Asian leaders often seem selective in the evil means which they denounce. While holding the West strictly accountable for its every mistake, they have frequently appeared indifferent to far more blatant acts by Communist countries. When Soviet tanks crushed the whole Hungarian people, who sought only freedom from foreign rule, many Asians seemed to be looking the other way.

Asians have a right to demand of the West a higher standard of ethical behavior in international affairs, more flexibility in negotiations, less emphasis on bombs and brute power, and a deeper understanding of the political and economic forces which

are setting the course of history. They even have a right to expect America to be mature enough to use its strength to hold back aggression without constantly reminding its less powerful friends that it is saving them from communism.

Americans and other Westerners have an equal right to expect from non-Communist Asians a more balanced outlook on the nature of the conflict which confronts us. The United States did not create the "cold war." It came upon us with an unforgettable shock.

A century that began with Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, Gandhi and Wilson was certain to be shaped by ideas. The struggle for the minds of men has now become sharp and clamorous. That struggle can and will be won by those nations east, south, north and west who genuinely subscribe to the principles laid down at Bandung, and who are now prepared to work together to give those principles substance in world affairs.

This, I believe, is the present-day challenge of East to West and West to East. May we accept it together with the passionate conviction of free men determined to remain free and to make freedom meaningful. As General Romulo said, our success "will be measured not by what we do for ourselves but by what we do for the whole human community."

(This article is excerpted from the address made by Chester Bowles, former United States Ambassador to India and author of *Ambassador's Report* and *New Conditions of Peace*, at the dinner of the Asian Ambassadors and the National Council on Asian Affairs in New York on December 6.)

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History Made Again at Gettysburg

The Eisenhower-Nehru talks were useful as well as unique; only history can say if they were decisive. They could only have been disappointing to those who expected too much from them. They did not create a Washington-New Delhi axis—although it is obvious that the United States today is closer to, and better liked by, the Afro-Asian group of states which Mr. Nehru represents than in the past. They did establish between the heads of the two largest democracies in the world, the two men who most clearly typify the East and the West, a good neighborliness and friendship that can be invaluable for world peace and progress.

The Gettysburg talks, however, did not result in any joint United States-Indian plan for settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute, nor any joint United States-Indian proposal to solve the Suez problem. President Eisenhower did not acquiesce in Peiping's admission to the UN; nor did Prime Minister Nehru accept Washington's views on a Kashmir plebiscite. The United States did not agree to abandon any military alliances because of Nehru's arguments that these alliances endanger peace; nor did India agree to denounce the U.S.S.R. because of its aggression and barbarism in Hungary. Washington is still too power-minded to suit Nehru; and New Delhi is still too much of an apologist for Moscow to please Eisenhower.

But whatever history's judgment may be, it is clear that these talks were useful, fruitful and valuable. The spokesman for the East, the recognized leader of Asia, had an opportunity not only to present his views on world affairs but to obtain

at first hand, and in privacy, the American interpretation of world events.

President Eisenhower is a soldier; Prime Minister Nehru, a scholar. The President is a pragmatist; the prime minister, an idealist. The President is a commoner; the prime minister, a Brahmin. But for all of their differences President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru have much in common. They are both dedicated to peace. They are both ardent supporters of justice. They are both earnest proponents of peace with justice. What unites them is immeasurably greater than what divides them.

Significance of Talks

The Gettysburg meeting between the President and the prime minister was unique. It was the President's first excursion alone into personal diplomacy. Always before he has had Secretary of State Dulles and his aides at his elbow in any meeting with president or premier to backstop his judgments and coach him on details. This time, for at least ten hours, the President ranged the world alone with Prime Minister Nehru in the quiet, comfort and seclusion of his Gettysburg farm.

Never before has the President been exposed for so long alone to the intellect and philosophy of Asia. Never before, it is certain, has the President listened to as sympathetic and lucid an explanation of Indian, as well as Asian, views in general as those Mr. Nehru unfolded. Never before has the President, without benefit of seconds, had to explain, expound and explore American policy so thoroughly to a friendly

critic. It may never be known, and perhaps it may remain a matter of opinion, as to who of the two leaders made the greater impression on the other. But the widely held view here is that Nehru was more of a "shocker" to Eisenhower than vice versa. Prime Minister Nehru's 24 hours spent with President Eisenhower at Gettysburg may well turn out to be the best public relations work he ever did.

This heart-to-heart, man-to-man talk, however, did not result in any eye-to-eye agreement between these two great democrats of the world. But it evidenced President Eisenhower's greater personal control and direction of his Administration's foreign policy. His first four years in the White House, it appears, increased his confidence in his own personal reactions, understanding and analysis of world affairs. Secretary Dulles' recent illness forced him to become his own Secretary of State during the climax of the Suez crisis. His is the doctrine of one moral law for ally and neutral, for Asia and Europe. He is also chief exponent in Washington of the still somewhat novel and suspect doctrine of renunciation of the use of force—a doctrine which undoubtedly pleased his Hindu guest but deeply disturbs his European allies.

At Gettysburg, which saw North and South lock armies in the great social and military clash of almost a century ago, the world watched East and West, symbolized by these two great leaders, come to grips with the major crises of our era.

It was a valuable, unique and historic day.

NEAL STANFORD



How Should U.S. Deal With Red China?

(This Forum is devoted to a discussion of the fourth topic in the series of eight "Decisions . . . 1957." One of the most controversial questions confronting the United States in 1957 is what this country should do if a majority of the members of the United Nations vote for admission of the Peiping government to represent China in the UN.

China is a founding member of the UN and holds a permanent seat, with the right of veto, in the Security Council, now occupied by the delegate of the Nationalist government on Taiwan (Formosa). The United States opposes the admission of Peiping on the ground that Communist China is still at war with the UN (only an armistice, not peace, has been signed in Korea); that Peiping was branded an aggressor by the General Assembly; that Peiping officials block armistice negotiations and threaten war to "liberate" Taiwan; and that Peiping still holds in prison ten United States citizens on charges such as "espionage." The United States contends, moreover, that Peiping does not represent a "peace-loving state" in the sense of the UN Charter, and that it could not be trusted to live up to its foreign policy obligations.

Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, Senate minority leader and member of the United States delegation to the 11th United Nations General Assembly, has frequently expressed his opposition to Peiping's admission to the UN as spokesman for China. On November 11, 1956, on the TV program *Meet the Press*, Senator Know-

land made the following statement in answer to a question by Pauline Frederick of NBC, who asked him whether he still thought the United States should withdraw from the UN if Peiping were admitted to represent China: "Yes, I do, and I'll tell you what the difference is on the two [Soviet Union and China]. The Soviet Union, unfortunately, is a charter member. There may be no way we can get them out under the Charter as it now exists, though I think, as I said, the moral condemnation of the world should be attempted. Communist China is not a member of the United Nations. To admit them in view of their record of aggression in Korea, the fact that they inflicted a million casualties upon the little Republic of Korea, 140,000 casualties upon the United States including 35,000 dead, that they are in violation of the Korean armistice now, to admit them under these circumstances would destroy the moral foundation of the United Nations, and I don't believe either the American Congress or the American people would feel that the United Nations would have a great deal of usefulness if they destroyed their moral position to that extent."

Here are two points of view on the decision we face.—The Editor)

THOSE who, like myself, believe that the United States should not at this time recognize Peiping or support its claim to represent China in the United Nations have a duty to discuss as objectively as possible the consequences for the UN if Peiping should nevertheless

by Ernest A. Gross

Mr. Gross was formerly U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. delegate to five General Assembly sessions, and U.S. deputy representative on the Security Council. In 1948 he was Assistant Secretary of State. At present he is an international lawyer, member of the firm Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt and Mosle, and a member of the Advisory Committee of the World Affairs Center.

be seated over our opposition.

What makes objective analysis difficult is, of course, the evil nature and brutal conduct of the Communist regime. There is no room to doubt that the admission of such a government in the UN would create a revulsion of American feeling toward that organization.

When Congress in July 1956 reaffirmed its conviction that "such admission would gravely injure the United Nations and impair its effective functioning," it was referring to the injury which would result from diminished American confidence in the UN. Yet this fact—for it is a fact—merely poses a problem. It does not supply the answer.

The United States may decide for itself when or whether to take the unilateral action of recognizing a foreign government. But the seating of a UN delegation is a matter for collective determination. Although we can usually influence decisions in the world organization, we cannot always control them.

Our Problem in UN

In the Security Council the veto does not apply to this question. If it did, the delegate of Nationalist China (as the last accredited Chinese representative) could veto his own successor. Hence the question of "credentials," as it is called, has been properly regarded as a matter of procedure rather than of substance. And under the UN Charter only questions of substance are subject to the veto in the Security Council. Recently, some confusion has

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by E. F. Penrose

Dr. Penrose, formerly adviser to the United States delegation to the Economic and Social Council of the UN and earlier to Ambassador John G. Winant in London, is professor of geography and international relations at The Johns Hopkins University.

THREE is no international issue today on which the policy of the United States is in more urgent need of revision than that which concerns its relations with China. It is chiefly through the efforts of the United States that the largest population in any single state, representing one quarter of the world's inhabitants, remains outside the UN and is cut off from normal diplomatic intercourse with the rest of the world, while nominal representatives of China sit in the UN, holding a veto power in the Security Council, although in fact they represent only a regime without power or influence in China and without prospect of ever acquiring any—a regime bolstered by United States arms and subsidies and imposed on the Formosan people without consultation.

The grounds on which attempts are made to justify United States policy toward China are that the *de facto* government of China is Communist, that it has acted harshly within China, that it is a "puppet" government which accepts orders from Russia and has no independent will of its own in international affairs, that it refused to join in condemnation of Russian acts in Hungary, and that it does not represent the Chinese people.

Communist Regimes in UN

Certainly the Chinese government is a Communist government. So also are the governments of Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which are represented in the UN and with which the United States maintains

diplomatic relations. Similarly the Chinese government acted harshly and brutally toward many of its people; so have the other governments just enumerated, and in addition Spain, Saudi Arabia and some of the Latin American countries.

It is true that China has allied itself with Russia. It has done so voluntarily for compelling reasons: considerations of balance of power, as well as economic interests, leave it no alternative course of action that would not threaten its security. China lies between the two largest and most heavily armed powers in the world. It is not surprising that it should ally itself with one of them when the other rebuffs it, keeps armed forces near its shores, boycotts its goods and puts pressure on other countries to do the same. The present policy of the United States strengthens the ties between China and Russia and enlarges the sphere in which their national interests are identical.

Peiping Not 'Puppet'

It does not follow that China is a "puppet" of Russia. The Chinese Communists learned useful techniques from Moscow and obtained some Japanese arms through its connivance, but suffered from Russian removal of industrial equipment in Manchuria. Their main strength was derived from indigenous sources. China is essentially a national Communist state. Its leaders encouraged the development of national communism in Poland, which Russia accepted only reluctantly under pressure. They disapproved of the uprising in Hungary only when national

communism as well as Stalinist communism began to crumble and the prospect was opened up of a social democracy that might ally itself with the West.

China, like Russia, is not and never has been a democracy. The extent to which its government represents the will of the people is unknown. In this it is no different from the governments of many other countries in the UN, which are also recognized by the United States and some of which have had Communist regimes imposed on them. Diplomatic recognition and membership in the international organizations normally depend, and should depend, on the *de facto* existence and not on the representative character of a government. Otherwise the United Nations would dissolve into armed alliances and counteralliances, and the hope of a world organization would disappear for many generations.

The circumstances which led to China's entry into the Korean war are a sufficient warning of the dangers of nonrecognition. At that time the Chinese foreign minister conveyed through India's Ambassador A. M. Panikkar a clear warning that if the UN armies continued to push toward the Chinese frontier China would feel obliged to enter the war. Mr. Truman in his memoirs comments that Panikkar had been "playing the game of the Communists"—a strange appraisal of this conservative Indian historian. China's entrance into the Korean war might have been avoided if the warning had come through a United States ambassador.

Finally, Washington's policy toward China is a constant source of embarrassment and concern to the Western allies, who, to avoid weakening the alliance, have several times

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arisen about this matter, but the logic seems clear. In any event, all other organs and bodies of the UN decide *all* questions within their competence by majority vote. The decision whether or not to admit Peiping ultimately will be made by a show of hands, and the United States raises only one hand.

The dilemma with which we are confronted can be stated simply. On the one hand the prevalent sentiment in our country is that to seat Peiping would betray the principles of justice and morality which underlie the Charter. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness that the UN will be used increasingly to help us solve our own problems.

Its effectiveness for our purposes will depend on the cooperation (or at least benevolent neutrality) which we can mobilize on the part of those many nations of Asia, Western Europe and other areas which feel strongly that the exclusion of the Chinese Communist regime from the UN involves the error of leaving that government outside the law of the Charter.

Given the state of American public opinion on this matter, our leaders face a harsh dilemma. Any relaxation of open and vigorous opposition on their part to seating Peiping not only exposes officials to widespread editorial attack but also implies to our restless allies that the diplomatic track is clear. At the same time our leaders must be aware that the more we turn to the UN to help us with controversial issues, such as Suez and Hungary, the greater will be the pressures to bring under the law of the Charter all who play major roles, whether of villainy or of virtue.

Under these circumstances it would seem that the tradition of

our democratic society imposes a duty upon citizens and private groups to "lead the leaders," so to speak. We should do ourselves the justice of making a fair evaluation of our own national interest.

This does not mean muting or playing down the facts concerning Communist aggression. What is necessary is to play up the facts concerning the true nature and functions of the UN.

Objections to Peiping

Too much emphasis on Red China's vices as a reason for its exclusion from the UN implies that Red Russia has some virtues entitling it to a seat in that body. In view of the difficulty of finding any such virtues, this line of reasoning could logically lead only to the conclusion that both of these states should be excluded. But nobody has as yet convincingly demonstrated that world peace would be more secure if the U.S.S.R. were prowling around in the shadows outside the halls of the UN.

It seems to me that the question is not what the effect would be on the United Nations if Peiping were to be seated. The UN would be no better or worse than it is with Red Russia as a member. The real question is what effect UN seating would have on Red China.

My view has been, and continues to be, that our support of Peiping's seating would confirm the Chinese Communists in their present lawless course and give them a propaganda advantage to which they are not entitled. This view is based on a reading of the nature and conduct of the totalitarian system.

On the other side are those who feel that Red China exists as a fact, that it should be brought into the forum of law and order, and that its exposure to the West might draw

it away from Moscow or might at least exploit natural sources of tension between China and the U.S.S.R.

I do not think either view is entitled to be acclaimed as representing the higher virtue or the higher morality. From a realistic standpoint the UN is neither a fire department (from which "firebugs" should be excluded) nor a police department (from which lawbreakers should be barred).

The UN is more like a world vessel with a disparate crew of sovereign states, none of which is required to embark and any of which can abandon ship at will. No mutinous member can be punished except as one or more other sovereign states see fit to do so and believe they have the necessary power.

If, contrary to the prevailing sentiment in the United States, the point of view of those nations which favor seating Red China prevails, we would have done ourselves no good by preparing the ship for scuttling. No one has yet built a better ship, or even a life-raft, on which we can ride out the storm.

Penrose

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voted contrary to their convictions—a sacrifice not reciprocated by the United States in the Middle East crisis. But the majority opposed to Peiping's admission is dwindling in the UN; and Washington's intransigence is leading it toward a diplomatic defeat. Is it too much to hope that the United States will set its Far Eastern policy on a more mature and responsible course in keeping with its responsibilities to its allies and to the rest of the world?

Between Liberation and Liberty: Austria in the Post-War World, by Karl Gruber. New York, Praeger, 1955. \$4.50.

The former Austrian foreign minister gives a lively account of his struggle to achieve the peace treaty concluded in May 1955, when Austria recovered its independence.



World on Razor's Edge

The widening repercussions of the Hungarians' heroic resistance to Russia had, by year's end, brought about profound changes in communism, in the political outlook of Europe, in military calculations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and in the world balance of power. The most prevalent conclusion was that the crisis in Eastern Europe was a two-edged sword. It could be both danger and opportunity. The crisis might plunge mankind into long-feared nuclear war, or it might open the way to a new golden era of global peace and economic improvement.

The outcome of this fateful choice, it was generally agreed, depended on the means Moscow would choose to resolve the dilemma created by the decision of Stalin's heirs to reject some—although by no means all—features of Stalinism,* to "liberalize" communism, and to carry out this admittedly delicate and perilous readjustment gradually, by peaceful means. Whether or not Khrushchev and his colleagues had genuinely hoped to reform communism without destroying the essence of its ideas and practices, the result of their own attacks on Stalinism had the effect of opening the floodgates first to criticism, then to various degrees of resistance or revolt in Eastern Europe, and to growing ferment in the U.S.S.R. itself.

Russia's Dilemma

The Russian leaders, with a suddenness which apparently took them by surprise, found themselves confronted with an anguished choice

between ruthless suppression of opposition, and acceptance, however unwelcome, of altered relationships between the U.S.S.R.—for a decade the dominant power in the region—and its small neighbors, which only yesterday seemed helpless to resist Moscow's military and economic power. The first course, not without zigzags, was adopted in Hungary, which refused to be either silenced or appeased; the second, in Poland, which has so far succeeded in carrying out an orderly reorganization.

Hungary and Communism

Hungary paid a tragic price for its determination to go all the way to the goal of independence—at least 25,000 dead, over 150,000 refugees, and a shattered economy. Poland, with a speed that few within or outside that oft-dismembered country could have anticipated, reached an accord between Communist state and Catholic Church which set a historic precedent. It also won from Moscow on December 17 an agreement regulating the presence of Soviet armed forces on its soil which contains guarantees compatible with national sovereignty and, according to *The New York Times* correspondent M. S. Handler in Warsaw, is comparable to the "status of forces" agreements worked out by our NATO allies regarding United States and British forces on their territories.

The shattering events in Hungary have seriously weakened the influence of Russian communism not only in Europe but also in the uncommitted nations of Asia. This was evidenced by the decision of Burma and Ceylon to vote for the United Nations resolution of December 12

condemning Russia, adopted by 55 votes to 8, and by the statement of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on December 18 during his visit to Washington that "colonialism, in any form or anywhere, is abhorrent." So far, however, Hungary—where people revolted not only against Russia but also against communism, although with no desire to return to things as they were before 1945—is a special case. Poland at one end of the Eastern European arc and Yugoslavia at the other have sought to maintain Communist regimes, although Wladyslaw Gomulka has gone far beyond Marshal Tito by promising free national elections and by effecting a reconciliation with the Catholic hierarchy. And reports from Western Europe, notably Italy, indicate that while the local Communist parties have lost in terms of membership, their hard core, to quote *The New York Times* Rome correspondent Arnaldo Cortesi, has become harder.

In Russia itself the events of Poland and Hungary did not go unnoticed. There, too, students and workers—the groups to which communism had directed its strongest appeal—have been increasingly vocal in demanding larger freedoms and higher living standards. As in other relatively underdeveloped countries at a comparable stage of industrialization, universal education and technological advances are encouraging what is often called "the revolution of rising expectations." This revolution is bound to have a significant impact on Russia's political system.

Whatever may be the future shape of Moscow's relations with its Eastern European neighbors—whether it

*See Vera Micheles Dean, "Has Moscow Repudiated All of Stalin?" FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, Vol. 35, No. 15 (April 15, 1956).

tries to suppress them by force, or eventually develops the "commonwealth" outlined in its policy statement of October 30 — events in Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Poland, have already profoundly altered the political outlook in Europe. On the one hand, responsible leaders of Western Europe and the United States fear that the Russians, if driven to a feeling of desperation, might take the risk of war, particularly should a revolt in East Germany win the unofficial support of the West Germans. On the other hand, some seasoned diplomats foresee the possibility that the Russians might agree to withdraw troops from Eastern Europe, provided the United States and Britain did likewise in Western Europe. Eventually, they believe, an all-European security system guaranteed by the United States and the U.S.S.R. might emerge that would permit not only the unification of Germany, which might be neutralized, but also the unification of the western and eastern segments of the Continent, with Eastern Europe achieving neutrality like that of Austria and Finland.

This new perspective has been opened up by the realization, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that the so-called satellites, in any case, can no longer be regarded as unquestioning military allies of Russia and that the withdrawal of Moscow's troops

could thus prove a reality and not a subterfuge. A mutual withdrawal, moreover, would be welcomed by Western European nations, which are eager to reduce their defense expenditures, particularly now, that their economies are strained by the aftereffects of the Suez crisis. And, moreover, Western military experts agree that if NATO is to defend Western Europe effectively against a Russian attack, it will have to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons rather than on standing armies, with which it cannot hope to match the manpower of the U.S.S.R.

Under these circumstances the West, which until the Hungarian revolt might have been expected to welcome any attempt to undermine or overthrow the Soviet empire, has adopted a cautious attitude toward the consequences of Eastern European unrest. Both in the United Nations and at the Paris NATO conference of December 10-14, the Western nations, while reaffirming their hope that the peoples of Eastern Europe will achieve freedom to choose the political and social order they prefer, have unequivocally indicated their determination to rely on moral suasion, through the pressure of world public opinion, and not on military force, to induce the U.S.S.R. to withdraw from Hungary. And at his press conference of December 18 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,

who had already made this point clear in his address of October 27 to the Dallas World Affairs Council, assured Moscow that the West did not want to take advantage of its difficulties in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe to create a belt of anti-Soviet states along its border, such as the *cordon sanitaire* France had sought to erect against Russia and communism after World War I. As Europe reassesses its own position in the world, it becomes increasingly aware of its dependence on the resources, transport routes, and goodwill of non-Western nations, from India to Japan, from Syria and Egypt to what was once "darkest" Africa. When the West now thinks of balance of power, it thinks not only in terms of the European continent or of the Atlantic community, but of the world as a whole. The Eisenhower-Nehru conversations symbolized this historic change of focus.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

A Single Pebble, by John Hersey. New York, Knopf, 1956. \$3.00.

While this book is tenuous as a novel, it conveys a cumulative feeling of awe about China's "Great River," the Yangtze, on which the author makes a memorable journey, and expresses in a sensitive way his evaluation of the East as seen by a Westerner.

The Sudan, by Sir Harold MacMichael. New York, Praeger, 1955. \$4.50.

A concise history and description of the country and people of the Sudan, the most recent member of the United Nations, written by an Englishman who for many years was civil secretary and governor-general of this Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.

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